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Medical men have been cast in a singularly dim light in recent histories of the
formative years ofpsychiatry. We aretold,correctly, thatthemedical ancien regime in
such traditional institutions for the mad as Bethlem-a regime of routine and
standardized bleedings, purges and vomits-was hidebound, rigid, and ineffectual. In
the 1750s, faced with an extraordinary attack from William Battie, Dr John Monro
defendedhislate father'sreliance, asphysician at Bethlem, onvenesection andemetics
as the best he knew. Somesixty years later, John Monro's son Thomas was in his turn
defending the identical therapies, admitting their relative worthlessness, but saying
that he "knew no better". This did not convince the House ofCommons Committee
before which he was giving evidence. That investigating body heard witness after
witness chorus William Battie's maxim that insanity responded better to management
than to medicine.' Indeed, its Report lavishly publicized and seemingly endorsed the
experiment ofthe York Retreat, an institution founded and run by lay Quakers, not
physicians. There, medicines had been tried and found wanting, and had been
replaced essentially bymoral therapy: kindness, example, influence, all bearing on the
mind and heart.
If the lay-dominated strategy of moral therapy thus struck a blow against the
doctors, themedicalprofession retaliated, so Scull and others haveargued, bystriving
to capture for itself both moral therapy and the asylums in which it was practised.2
Medical pressure upon Parliament successfully secured for medically-qualified
superintendents exclusive legalcontrol ofthe newpublicasylums, and thuseffectively
turned psychiatry into a medical monopoly. In reality, however, historians continue,
medicine per se had nothing positive to contribute to the cure of the insane. The
medications increasingly deployed in the Victorian asylum-bromides, croton oil and
the like-had little more to recommend them than the ancient aloes and assafoetida
had; and they merely paved the way for later, no less psychiatrically inappropriate,
and indeed cruel psycho-surgery. Many oftoday's historians have verymixed feelings
about the enterprise of psychiatry per se. But they have been almost united in
dismissing the historical antecedents ofpsychological medicine as, essentially, classic
examples of medical imperialism, which served, wittingly or not, to mask the real
nature and causes of mental disturbance.3
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Things were not, of course, so simple. Above all, medicine itself was never
homogeneous; and so, afortiori, there never was such a thing as a united face of
psychological medicine, or ofthe medicine ofthe mind. Doctors ofcourse tended to
share, at the deepest level, a common approach to insanity, a tendency to look to
organic aetiologies, and a faith in drugs as instruments oftherapy. But there the unity
ceased. To general medicine, Brunonianism presented a Young Turks movement,
combatingtheentrenched orthodoxies oftheage;4and soitshould be nosurprisethen
that in psychological medicine too, John Brown's followers set out to challenge both
the standard theories expounded at Edinburgh and other schools and the standard
therapies deployed by physicians at Bethlem, in such public asylums as that at
Manchester, and in the private trade in lunacy.
Research in depth would be required to demonstrate just how many, and to what
extent, doctors both theoretically and practically active in insanity were devotees of
the Brunonian system. John Brown himself took no special interest in mental
disorder,5 though he of course had no difficulty in fitting mania and melancholia
respectively into his general scheme ofsthenic and asthenic disease. In Philadelphia,
that errant Brunonian, Benjamin Rush, followed Brown's emphasis upon the
explanatory power of the notions of over- and under-excitation, and embraced a
therapeutics which, like Brown's, set great store by the virtues ofopium; but Rush's
claims that the aetiology ofinsanity lay in the blood and the vascular system, and his
conviction that heroic venesection was the panacea, were essentially unique to
himself.6 A similarly partial Brunonianism can also be found in Thomas Beddoes,
whose root-and-branch attack in the Hygeia7 upon the nosological enterprise of
carving up insanity into a complex taxonomy ofclasses and species precisely followed
Brown's denial ofthe ontological theory ofdisease, and his faith in its essential unity
and simplicity.
More wholly and authentically Brunonian was Robert Jones's An enquiry into the
nature, causes and termination ofnervousfevers; together with observations tending to
illustrate themethodofrestoring His Majesty to health andofpreventing relapses ofhis
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disease, published in 1789,8 unfortunately forJonesjust beforeGeorge III'srecovery
from his first bout of insanity. Probably with a view to rescuing the King from
imputations ofbeing out ofhismind, Jones contended that the royal disease was not
"insanity" at all, but a "nervous fever". They were difficult to distinguish, he
admitted, but the court physicians' reports before the Parliamentary committee
clearly pointed to nervous delirium. Because this fever was "asthenic", the King's
current treatment-the lowering regime ofblistering, purging, etc., employed above
all by the Willises-was utterly mistaken. Instead George's "debilitated state of
body" required tonic treatments to build him up and sustain him: "He should now
indulge in animal food, and a proper quantity ofwine. Music, provided it is not too
loud, will be of great service." Mental and emotional stimulus would also be
beneficial: above all, access to his family should form part of a general strategy
aiming to "invigorate, by all possible means, the body, and to afford every
consolation to the mind."
Jones had nothing but contempt for the royal doctors. Their diagnoses had been
inept; worst still, their wanton use of the term "insanity" had needlessly spread
pessimism, on account ofits connotations ofbeing both a hereditary condition and
anincurabledisease. Butasayoungprovincialphysicianwhosebookappearedatthe
worst possible moment, he found no audience and seems to have made no further
contribution to interpreting or indeed treating mental conditions. Indeed, he
published no further books of any kind.
A more substantial figure altogether, as a champion of Brunonian psychiatry, is
George Nesse Hill. Born in 1766, Hill, unlike Jones, was too young to have been a
pupil ofBrown in Edinburgh (he seems to have studied mainly under Dr Maddocks
at the London Hospital). He passed his career as a surgeon in Chester, claiming to
have had "in early life the superintendence of two houses for the reception of
lunatics", though little is known about his life. His claims to fame rest entirely upon
his weighty 450-page tome, An essay on theprevention andcure ofinsanity-his only
book-which came out in 1814, after, he claimed, "thirty years' experience" in
handling the mad.9
There is no indication that Hill's treatise had any major impact upon
contemporary thought or practice. Indeed, he was conspicuous in not being one of
thosecalledupon togiveevidencebeforetheCommonsCommittee thenextyear; nor
was his book referred to at its hearing. And unlike, say, thewritings ofSamuel Tuke,
Joseph Mason Cox, or Thomas Mayo, there is no sign that any of his volume's
recommendations for the reform ofthe public treatment ofthe mad was ever acted
upon. Indeed, therein lies his interest. For as a Brunonian writing thirty-five years
after Brown'sdeath, Hill wasutterly outofstepwithhistimes. Andhispositionasan
old-style medical radical, a prophet crying in the wilderness, far away from the
8 See Robert Jones, An enquiry into the nature, causes and termination ofnervousfevers; together with
observations tending to illustrate the methodofrestoring His Majesty to health andpreventing relapses ofhis
disease, Salisbury, Robinson, 1789. Fordiscussion see I. Macalpine and R. Hunter, GeorgeIIIandthemad
business, London, Allen Lane, 1969, 99f.
9 George Nesse Hill, An essay on theprevention andcure ofinsanity, with observations on the rulesfor the
detection ofpretenders to madness, London, Longmans et al., 1814.
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mainstream, enabled him to stand as a very fundamental critic ofhis age. His work
above all shows that medical men were by no means united in an endeavour to
monopolize the control of mad people for themselves within the emergent asylum
system.
Hill was by no means uncritical ofBrown.'0 He had read widely in the English and
Continental literatureofhistimes, andabsorbed agreatdealfrom StruveandPinel, as
well as from Cox, Erasmus Darwin, "the acute Beddoes"" and others. But his basic
understanding of the nature of insanity was impeccably Brunonian. Health was the
state when the body's excitability- that "wonderful and inexplicable property"12
which was a defining feature oflife itself-was receiving the right amount ofenergy
from exciting powers both external and internal ("equable stimulation" was his
phrase).'3 Too much or too little excitement produced sickness, sthenic or asthenic
diseaserespectively. That kindofsthenicconditioncharacterized byderangementand
disorientation of the mind, of conduct and speech-its symptoms were ravings,
delusions, non-stopchatter, andthelike-wasmania. Thatkindofasthenicdistemper
accompanied by mental collapse-by the narrowing ofconsciousness to a repetitious
absorption withidesfixes, byvacancy, fatuity, and stupor-wasmelancholia. Or, put
another way, mania set in when the excessively stimulated constitution erupted not
merely in such physical symptoms as fever, but in mental agitation; and melancholia
resulted when too little stimulus, under-excitement, produced not only such physical
signs as debility, but an under-stimulated mind, manifest in such signs as idiotism or
taedium vitae, bordering on suicide.
For Hill, characterizing madness thus was important for many reasons. For one
thing, it radically and dramatically demolished the whole taxonomic fantasy-world
originallycreated byWilliamCullen,whowas"lessclearanddecided uponthesubject
of insanity than on any other disease",14 and enlarged upon by Cullen's followers,
among them Erasmus Darwin and-one of Hill's particular betes noires-Thomas
Arnold. All suchclassificatory schema were hopelessly abstract, dogmatic, aprioristic
and idealist. "The almost endless shades ofdifference branched out into species by
learned Nosologists and Metaphysicians", grumbled Hill, "have no one beneficial
tendency, beingonlycalculated toencumber science, disguise truth, renderrugged and
dishearteningthepaths ofenquiry toyoungminds", and soforth.'5 Thedifferentiae of
mental illness did not identify clusters ofdistinct diseases with distinct and constant
symptoms and signs; or rather they did so only in the crazy systems of obsessive
theorists. Madness was a state, rather than an ontological entity. Insanity was a
manifestationwhich, Hillstressed, had tobeunderstood"symptomatically": "insanity
is always a symptomatic disease".'6 It was, as it were, a barometric reading on a
particular individual, depending on quite individual propensities, balances, and
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responses. An action or habit-for example, consumption of heavy quantities of
alcohol-precipitating manic insanity in one person would be quite conducive to the
health of another (indeed, for such a toper, leaving off heavy drinking might itself
trigger incurable torpor). Thus it was a nonsense to approach any understanding of
insanity by proceeding as Arnold and Darwin had, bycooking up a natural history of
diseases. Insanity was rather to be understood as "one species" only, as a process
characterized by physiological actions and reactions, stimuli and responses.'7
Indeed, in order to handle particular manifestations ofmadness, it was ofcardinal
importance to know the individual. Detailed case histories, conducted in depth, were
essential. For insanity was not an absolute but a relative matter; it registered a
discrepancy between the healthy requirement for excitation of a particular
constitution, and the quantum of stimulus being received or generated. For that
reason, it was vital to understand the precise concatenation of pre-existing
circumstances finally issuing in mental disorder. Of vast importance was the
individual's constitutional diathesis, or, in otherwords, hisgeneralpredisposition and
habit. How much food, exercise, work, mental activity was he capable of and
accustomed to? Age, gender, size, habit, early diseases, education, strength,
occupation, physique, physiognomy (in the literal sense, for Hill admired Lavater): all
these factors and many more (Hill termed them "predisponent causes"')'8 together
amounted to an individual's diathesis towards mental illness. This applied in both an
overall sense (how likely was such a person to succumb?), and more particularly (how
would certain triggers-a brain injury, a personal calamity-affect particular
individuals?). Without a detailed predispositional history, the symptoms of mental
illness could be drastically, and even fatally, misread. Someone deeply agitated might
mistakenly be diagnosed as suffering from mania, be given such drastic depletive
treatments as heroic blood-lettings as a consequence, and thus might well become
fatuous and be rendered incapacitated for life. By contrast, the expert diagnostician,
with a knowledge of the diathesis in such a case, might well recognize the basically
asthenic constitution and so pinpoint the therapeutic need, not for sedation and
depletion, but rather formeasured, exact, precise stimulus, especially to reactivate the
stomach and bowels.
Indeed Hill believed, very much in the spirit ofBrown himself, that it was asthenic
conditions (often misjudged by superficial practitioners as sthenic) which actually
posed theworst problems. Put anotherway, Hill, like Brown, distrusted theready and
easy recourse todepletivemedicinesandmeasures, notleasttheblood-lettingwhichall
too often was mistaken as a panacea in cases offrenzy and agitation. For Hill, proper
knowledgeofpredisposingfactorsandtheproximatecauses ofinsanitywouldproduce
diagnoses which, in the overwhelming majority of cases would indicate that
appropriately gradated and diversified stimulus which would induce that
strengtlhening of the system which the restoration of mental health demanded.
A pillar of Hill's system, then, was the need to treat individual cases individually.
Disease-centred approaches must give way to person-focused ones. Such mass and
7 Ibid., p. xiii.
18 Ibid., p. v.
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routine treatments characteristic of the madhouse as the group annual Spring
blood-let and vomit at Bethlem, defended by the Monros and by John Haslam, all of
whom served as Hill's whipping boys, were quite criminal.'9
Aboveall, close attention to individual diathesis would provefruitful inprevention.
HillcalledhisbookanEssayon thepreventionandcureofinsanity, andtheattention he
paid to prevention is quite unusual in the contemporary insanity literature, with its
standardemphasis on thehandling ofthemad oncethey hadalready been delivered to
theasylum. For Hill, an ounceofprevention wasworthfar more than apound ofcure,
and with his emphasis upon diathesis, upon organic habit, upon the need for regular
stimulus as the sine qua non of health, he believed that it was possible to follow
"precautions"20andregimenswhich setastraightcourseformentalhealth. Moreover,
friends and relatives should beable to spotthe tell-talesignsofinsanitywhenthey first
appeared-bodily changes, alterations in the eye and countenance, shifts in manners
and habits-and to intervene in time to forestall disaster. Those on the brink ofmania
could be soothed by changes of habitat, scene and occupation; those sliding into
melancholy could be stimulated by travel, by new hobbies, by a richer diet, by
enlarging their circle of friends, and so forth.21
No less important to Hill, another shaft of light shed by Brunonianism onto
insanity, was thetheory'sfundamental organicistholism. Sthenicandasthenicdisease,
mania and melancholy alike, were attributes of the entire organic system, a single,
unitary "human machine", in which the body, "together with the mind [formed] one
homogeneous mass".22 They were notjust sited in, or excited by, the nerves, the liver,
the heart, the blood (at this point, Hill certainly parted company with Rush), the guts
ortheuterus (Hill infact saysquiteremarkably little aboutspecialdiseases ofwomen).
They were not even principally lesions ofthe brain. Above all, they wereemphatically
not sited in some immaterial principle, some disembodied consciousness, some
free-floating cogito.
Although Hill had the greatest respect for the insights of the associationist
philosophy of mental mechanisms developed by Locke and enlarged by Hartley, he
deplored metaphysical accounts of mental illness as absurd mystifications. It was
arbitrary to separate mind from body, and it baffled understanding. Moreover,
experience itself showed that immaterialism was just a tissue of "metaphysical
cobwebs".23 The derangement ofthe mind could always be shown, by the observant
physician, tobeaccompanied bysuchvisibleorganicchangesasadifferentskincolour,
squinting eyes, a racing pulse, tics, and even, Hill claimed, a quite unmistakable fetid
smell absolutely unique to the insane. But these manifestations did more than
"accompany": theycaused aswell. For Hill repeatedly argued that suchbodilydefects
as liver complaints, irritation or inflammation of the bowels, intestinal worms and
fever brought about the characteristic mental over-excitation ofmania, such as the
inability toconcentrate on anyone subject formore than amoment, orofmelancholy,
19 Ibid., p. iii.
20 Ibid., p. 240; see also p. 236f.
21 Ibid., p. 264.
22 Ibid., p. 17.
23 Ibid., p. 35.
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such as anxiety, anguish, hypochondria. Because "organic functions precede mental
operations",24 because "mind itself is the product of bodily sensation",25 because
consciousness stemmed from organized existence, because thought arose from the
excitation of the senses connected to the nerves, there could be no mental disease
without physical diathesis, without organic disease. Hill was insistent on this point.
Insanity, he argued, "is never a purely mental disease"; it "always has corporeal
disease for its foundation".26
Characteristically, Hill favoured therapies initiallyand fundamentally involvingthe
cleansing and rectification ofthe body: the use ofemetics, laxatives and so forth. His
strategy however was not routinely to deplete, but to rid the body ofobstructions and
toxic material. For all body waste typically produced pain, irritation and liverishness.
Hill'sgoalwas to toneupthe stomachandthebowels, and to restimulate healthybody
action.
Hill anticipated stigmatization as an evangel for a "cold and comfortless system of
materialism".27 He was, afterall, publishing before theend ofthe Napoleonic War, in
the aftermath of the "alarm" against the revolutionary materialist ideologies of the
French Revolution. He emphasized, however, how his doctrine deserved to be
embraced by all who had at heart the understanding of insanity, and the health of
lunatics. For by stressing the corporality of insanity on the one hand, he removed
madness from therealmsofmystery, andrendereditasintelligibleasallotherdiseases.
On the other, he rendered insanity as amenable to medical therapeutics as other
comparable diseases such as fevers. This paved theway for the second original feature
ofHill's system: itsdistinctive, andhighlyimpressive, therapeutical thoroughness. One
of the noteworthy features of so many writings on insanity, in the half century
preceding Hill, is how little they say about the medical management of the mad.
Authors like Samuel Tuke ventured little because they thought that little was to be
said. Others, like Thomas Arnold, were more interested in nosology, taxonomy and
diagnosis. Still others, like Thomas Bakewell, were sitting on family nostrums which
they chose to conceal (Hill found this practice quite scandalous). William Perfect
would be an instance ofthose who used such stock items as aloes, bark and paregoric
essentially as a "liquid cosh", to render the patient tractable. All of this neglect and
imprecision Hill denounced, attacking the "inattention the rational method ofcuring
insanity has experienced".28 In his view, "too little reliance has been placed upon
medical agents in the cure of insanity, and too few a number of them have been
employed to obtain the end in view".29 By contrast, he devoted close on two hundred
pages to the rationale and the practice ofdrug therapies, not omitting such details of
"efficacious medicines"30 as how best to make up such drugs as digitalis, and thus
avoid the adulterations of the druggists.
24 Ibid., p. 50.
25Ibid., p. 37.
26 Ibid., p. Xiii.
27 Ibid., p. 52.
28 Ibid., p. iv.
29 Ibid., p. 208.
30 Ibid., p. ii.
95Roy Porter
Hill recognized theindispensability ofsedatives inhandlingmania, which was, after
all, thedisease ofover-excitation; and hedevoted manypages toassessingthevalue of
camphor for this purpose (he approved), and to showing thathyoscyamus was in this
respect better for melancholics than opium, his lack of enthusiasm for which
distinguished him from Brown. Even so, the thrust of his pharmacy was always
towards stimulus rather than depletion. Ifirritation caused mania, and irritation was
often caused by obstructions in the guts or the bowels, the proper course of
medicines-gentle purgatives, measured emetics-would aim to stimulate theregular,
lively action ofthe digestive parts, normalize excitation, and so restore concentration.
The effects could be seen. Hill argued that maniacs were habitually costive. Their
vomits brought upvastquantities ofmucousphlegm; purges removedhard, indurated
faecalmaterial. Both observations proved theessentially organicdetermination ofthe
diseases of the mind.
To a large degree, therefore, treating the mad was a matter of the expert
management of medication, requiring "practical observers" and "medical artists"
rather than "speculative philosophers".31 Daily vigilance and flexibility were crucial,
individual adjustment essential. Thus with purging, he noted, "whatever laxative is
adopted, it must simply act as such day by day, being augmented, diminished, or
wholly suspended, conformable to the strength ofthe patient and his peculiar habits
and present circumstances".32 Hill believed therapeutics to be an art peculiarly
neglected, partly because the physician all too often saw himself as superior to his
drugs: once he prescribed, he felt his task complete. By contrast, Hill argued, the true
physician would also make up, administer, and test the effects ofhis own medicines.
Particularly evil was the indiscriminate use, very common in large asylums, of
pacifyingmedicines, largelyasawayofensuringtractability. Heavysedation, lowdiet,
cold and inactivity would combine to produce drastic under-excitement and
enervation, which would convert a sthenic into an asthenic condition. Mania would
turn to stupor, imbecility, and "fixed contemplation", leading to people permanently
"encased in torpor". Such melancholy would prove radically incurable.33 Controlled
and supervised medication with the right stimulants would prove a far superior
technique for tackling maniacal conditions which, despite first appearances, were far
morepromising in their prognosis than were stupor and low spirits, simply because of
the maniacs' high degree ofexcitability.
Herein weretheexisting lunatic asylums appallingly deficient. Either they neglected
proper medication by design, preferring the metaphysical dogmatism of moral
therapy; or they performed mass medication, rather as a missionary might perform
mass baptism. Nothing was worse than the "routine of hospital practice, painful
coercion, starving ... bleeding adlibitum"-precisely what he found Thomas Monro
and John Haslam defending at Bethlem.34 This was only one of a whole string of
complaints Hill levelled against madhouses. Indeed, he comprehensively assailed
them; they were, as he quoted from John Reid, "manufactories ofmadness", whose
31 Ibid., pp. 230, 250. 32 Ibid., p. 342.
33 Ibid., pp. 186, 234.
34 Ibid., p. 225.
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existence largely pandered to the convenience ofrelatives and friends, but which were
neverconducive to the good ofthe sufferer. Radical hostility amongstmedical men to
the very institution of the asylum was not unknown: Andrew Harper-interestingly
another surgeon-had made a comparable attack some thirty years earlier.35 But no
contemporary questioned the rationale and the efficacy ofthe asylumper se, good or
bad, so comprehensively or indeed so perceptively as Hill. Since his assault upon the
asylum flowed quitedirectly from his Brunonian principles, itisimportant toexamine
it here.
Asylums had many individual faults, and all too many of them were run by
"ignorant and barbarous keepers".36 But the veryprinciple ofthe asylumwas vitiated
bythreefundamentalflaws. First, theynecessarilygavegeneraltreatment-sometimes
cruel, like beatings, sometimes ineffectual, like moral therapy-whereas mad people
needed utterly personal treatment. Individualdiet, individual medication, individually
regulateddosesoflight, exercise,freedom, andsoforthwereessentialforrecovery. But
madhouses necessarily standardized all these items, for large facilities lacked
flexibility. Overall, the effect was disastrous. "It is often more difficult to repair the
mischief induced by the improper treatment ofmadness than it would have been to
cure the original disease".37
Second, nothing could jeopardize chances of recovery more certainly than the
herding oflarge numbers ofthe mad together. For one thing, Hill strongly suspected
that madness was contagious, thanks to the odour or effluvia ("inbred air")38 which
the insane emitted. For another, the mad were in constant need of the right kind of
stimulus, whichwouldenliven their spirits andconcentrate theirattention. Howcould
thecompany ofdozens ofthe low-spirited, torpid, and incoherent help the individual?
No sooner would he begin to regain his senses, than he would find himself
overwhelmed again by the inanity and fatuity ofthose around him. As lucid intervals
supervened, it wasabsolutely essential thattheenvironment ofthemadperson should
be tailored towards normality. In the asylum, the convalescent mad person, finding
himself surrounded by lunatics, was likely to relapse into chronic insanity.
Third, theasylumperpetuated inbricksandmortarwhatthemetaphysical theoryof
insanity engendered in the mind. This was the notion that insanity was a special,
unique, distinct disorder, a disease, which inevitably and rightfully carried shame,
odium, and stigma: in short, the notion that insanity was "tainted".39 Not least, as a
consequence, insanity was believed to be hereditary. This was erroneous, Hill argued;
but the belief which denied "every cheering ray" rendered it peculiarly difficult for
familiestohandle.40 Becausemadness-unlike, say, intermittentfever-wasshameful,
parents orfriends would not act upon ituntil it wasconfirmed and advanced; in other
words, until itwastoolate, forwhatthelunaticneeded aboveallwas "earlyinstitution
ofthe effective means ofcure".41 Then they would opt for the asylum on theprinciple
35 Andrew Harper, A treatise on the real cause andcure ofinsanity, London, Stalker and Waltes, 1789.
36 Hill, op. cit., note 9 above, p. iv.
37 Ibid., p. 176.
38 Ibid., p. 362.
39 Ibid., p. vii.
40 Ibid., p. xii.
41 Ibid., p. 174.
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of"outofsight, outofmind"; or,perhaps, becauseofthestigmawouldreclaim aloved
onefromcareattooearlyastage. Mostappallinglyofall,residenceinanasylumwould
impressupon theconsciousness ofthe sick personhimself, atleast as herecovered, the
recognition that he was actually "mad". Dreadful, dishonourable and degrading,
asylum confinement would create in the lunatic's mind "more terror than prison".42
And the shock and stigma entailed would almostcertainly trigger a relapsequite fatal
to all hopes of lasting recovery.
Inthenameofhumanity, and forthesakeoftherapeuticsuccess,sequestration must
be avoided. Brunonianism spelt out the alternative. There was nothing special about
insanity: itwas acondition, like all otherdiseases, oforganic excess ordeficiency. The
hallucinations, the warped ideas, ofthe mad constituted no special problem, for such
thoughts and passions were "secondary", merely symptomatic.43 Madness was as
"generally curable as those violent diseases most successfully treated by medicine".44
No special institution, no unique mad doctor, was needed. Indeed, quite the reverse:
Theresult oflongattention tothismatterenables me to state from the fullestconviction, and
without the smallest hesitation, that not one recent case ofmadness however violent ought
under any pretence whatever to be consigned to a public or private receiving house.45
What was required, as an alternative, was an expert regime of medication and
controlled accesstostimulus. Theidealdoctorshouldhavea"Lavaterianeye", should
be a "vigilant observer", and should possess great "versatility".46 This role was best
conducted by a local physician, even by the family doctor; certainly by someone
knowledgeable about the patient's general health and habits. Such treatment should
not take place within the home, for all too often it had provided the root-cause of
insanity in the first place. The ideal solution would be to board an individual lunatic
eitherwith, orunder the supervision of, a regularpractitioner interested in the care of
the mad. Thereby all associations counter-productive of early treatment would be
avoided, and the intensification of personal care would dramatically improve cure
rates. Madhouses were, ofcourse, cheaper than boarding with practitioners. But this
economy was entirely false because all too often, madhouses merely confirmed
madness and thus rendered the patient a lifelong charge on family or parish. True
economy lay in curing the maximum number possible, and that required early
intervention: "direct medical remedies can never be too early introduced, or too
energetically applied".47 Caught early, "nine out of twelve, or even ten, cases of
madness admit ofpermanent cure".48 The only valid function ofa madhouse was to
house incurables.
The stages through which Hill arrived at these conclusions are not quite clear,
although they flow logically and consistently from his Brunonian attachments. These
commitments may well, of course, have reflected a certain self-interest. Hill's case
42 Ibid., p. 381.
43 Ibid., p. 258.
Ibid., p. xiii.
45 Ibid., p. 220.
46 Ibid., pp. 261, 361, 370.
47 Ibid., p. 205.
48Ibid., p. 214.
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studies, appended to the end of his volume, show that he had applied the system he
advocated; he claimed to have had the superintendence oftwo madhouses, experience
which clearly disabused him of that expedient.
What is clear, however, is that he ended up penning the most dramatic rejection of
the whole emergent system of care and treatment of lunatics, and the most closely
argued alternative. In spite of Hill's arguments, asylums were reformed, fortified,
enlarged, rationalized, liberalized, and reformed again and again. But Hill's
prediction about their necessary failure proved substantially true. Only nowadays,
perhaps, are we once more seriously grappling with thepossibility that the distinction
of psychiatry from general medicine may have proved a vast strategic mistake.
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